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1 Introduction
A common argument for voting mechanisms is that they help aggregate the information that
agents in a committee privately hold, and thus lead to better decisions compared to the case
of a single decision-maker. Indeed, in a setting of collective decision-making where agents
have purely common interests, the celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) suggests that
the simple majority rule can lead to the first-best outcome if agents truthfully convey their
private information through their votes (Condorcet, [1785] 1994). However, Kawamura and
Vlaseros (2017) (henceforth KV) make the interesting observation that, as long as there exists
a public signal that can be commonly observed by all agents and that is superior to each of
their private signals, a vote-your-private-information strategy profile will not constitute an
equilibrium under the simple majority rule, even though this would have been the case if
the public signal were absent. What’s worse, the presence of public information opens the
possibility for agents to coordinate on an equilibrium in which everyone just votes according
to whatever the public signal suggests. Clearly, in such an equilibrium, the private information
of the committee members is completely disregarded. This can be very inefficient since public
information is rarely perfect and the total private information possessed by the committee is
often more valuable in determining the optimal collective decision. Experimentally, KV find
that a large proportion of subjects in the laboratory behave quite consistently with what the
inefficient equilibrium would predict. Consequently, the outcome of the collective decision
almost always coincides with that in the inefficient equilibrium.
This observation is highly relevant, because it should be clear that the access to both pri-
vate and public information for the voters is the rule rather than the exception: in business,
members of the board of directors receive (or even ask) advice from the advisory board of the
company; in a court, an expert witness states his/her testimony in front of all members of the
jury; the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which has only seven mem-
bers, often invites renowned scholars in the relevant fields to give short presentations when
important decisions that affect the well-being of more than 1.3 billion people are needed to
be made. If in the end only the public information counts, why should we bother to use the
voting mechanism in the first place? This issue is even more alarming if we take into account
that in reality, the party that provides the relevant public information is often strategic and
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self-interested as well.
With these practical concerns in mind, we first take KV’s observation one step further in
this paper. We study the effect of public information in a richer setting where agents have
both common and conflicting interests: while agents share the common goal of making a col-
lective decision that will match the state, they may have different payoffs from the different
types of decision errors that could occur. We show that the presence of public information can
have a profound impact on the agents’ voting behavior. In particular, it significantly limits the
existence of the informative voting equilibrium, in which every agent simply casts her vote in
accordance with her private information: If the public information is superior to each agent’s
private information and the voting threshold is fixed (which is the case for the simple major-
ity rule), the informative voting equilibrium does not exist for any preference profile of the
agents.1 To make things worse, the presence of public information introduces the intuitive but
inefficient obedient voting equilibrium, which robustly exists under different voting rules. In
the obedient voting equilibrium, agents always support the alternative suggested by the public
information and, hence, the public information is the only determinant of the final decision
outcome. We later show that a self-interested party who controls the provision of public in-
formation may exploit its influential effect by strategically disclosing (withholding) good (bad)
news about his favored alternative.
The inefficient outcome of the obedient voting equilibrium echos the common concern that
public information, especially expert opinions, may have excessive influence on decision mak-
ing.2 In theory, if agents are sophisticated enough to coordinate on equilibria that entail mixed
and/or asymmetric strategy profiles, then the committee’s decision may still incorporate both
the private and the public information. However, as we argue in Section 4.1, the concern of
public information being detrimental should be far from being resolved by this theoretical pos-
sibility. In particular, by extending the baseline model and considering more generally how the
provision of public information introduces correlation between the signals privately observed
by the agents, we are able to show that informational inefficiency can persist even in large
1Even if the public information is less accurate than the private information, the set of preference profiles that
allow for informative voting under some voting rule with a fixed threshold is strictly smaller than it would be in
the absence of the public information. For example, if the public information is just slightly less precise than each
agent’s private information, under the simple majority rule the informative voting equilibrium exists only if all
agents are sufficiently unbiased ex ante (see Corollary 2).
2For instance, because of the concern that their testimonies will have too much influence upon the jury, in the
US court rules are set to prevent expert witnesses from “usurping the province of the jury” (Tanay, 2010).
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elections, no matter how sophisticated the equilibria played by the agents are.
We then study the design of optimal voting mechanisms in environments with public in-
formation. We first introduce a class of more flexible voting rules that we call the contingent
k-voting rules. Under a contingent k-voting rule, the number of votes required for the commit-
tee to select an alternative will depend on the content of the public information: For example, if
a job candidate is supported by an exceptionally strong recommendation letter, the committee
may consider requiring less votes to approve the hire of this candidate. We show that for any
anonymous and ex post incentive compatible direct mechanism that is optimal, there exists an
equivalent contingent k-voting rule. Specifically, by sustaining informative voting as an equi-
librium (or implementing informative voting), the equivalent contingent k-voting rule achieves
the same informational efficiency as the optimal anonymous and ex post incentive compatible
mechanisms. Therefore, in the search for optimal mechanisms it is without loss to focus on
contingent k-voting rules that can implement informative voting.
A contingent k-voting rule incorporates the public information by letting its voting thresh-
old be contingent on the realization of the public signal. It also incorporates the private infor-
mation of the agents if it is responsive, which requires that the agents’ votes can always make
a difference on the final decision, regardless of the realization of the public signal. We show
that it is often optimal to use a responsive contingent k-voting rule to implement informative
voting. Moreover, the informative voting equilibria sustained by the responsive contingent
k-voting rules are asymptotically efficient, in the sense that the ex ante probability of the col-
lective decision being matched to the state becomes arbitrary close to 1 as the size of the com-
mittee increases. In other words, we obtain a version of the CJT in a voting environment with
both private and public information.
Within a setting where agents have purely common interests, which is mostly studied in the
literature, we demonstrate that the first-best informational efficiency can always be achieved
by using a specific contingent k-voting rule, the contingent majority rule, under which the in-
formative voting equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. In particular, we show that given all the
information that is available to the committee, the probability of the collective decision being
matched to the state is maximized in the informative voting equilibrium under the contingent
majority rule. In other words, the contingent majority rule aggregates both the private and the
public information efficiently.
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To strengthen the applicability of our results, we further introduce a simple two-stage vot-
ing mechanism that can equivalently implement the informative voting equilibrium under the
contingent k-voting rules. In the first stage of this voting mechanism, agents vote to select
the voting threshold that will be used. In the second stage, they proceed to vote about which
collective decision to take by using the voting rule that they agreed on. We argue that this two-
stage voting mechanism is practically appealing because its procedure is deterministic and
independent of the informational details of the environment.
Finally, we show, perhaps to one’s surprise, that using voting procedures that incorporate
the public information can actually have additional advantages when there is a concern for
strategic disclosure of public information. Intuitively, the use of the contingent k-voting rules
or the above two-stage voting mechanism makes it possible for the agents to rationally commit
to informative voting, independent of the disclosure policy of the public information. Thus,
even a self-interested party may find it optimal to always publicly communicate the informa-
tion it receives to the agents, given that its message will not directly affect the agents’ voting
behavior but will indirectly increase the accuracy of the collective decision.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents
the model. In Section 4 we show how the presence of public information can lead to inefficient
information aggregation. We study in Section 5 the design of optimal voting mechanisms with
public information. In Section 6, we analyze settings where the provision of public informa-
tion is strategically determined by a self-interested information controller. Finally, Section 7
concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature on strategic voting starting with the seminal paper of Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996). Many of the papers in this literature study how informational ef-
ficiency of various voting mechanisms is affected by the agents’ strategic behavior (see, e.g.,
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) and Duggan and Martinelli (2001) on simultaneous voting
rules, and Dekel and Piccione (2000) on sequential voting rules). Among all of them, the most
closely related paper besides KV is actually Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). Specifically, they
notice that whenever the voters do not have an extremely biased prior, the informative vot-
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ing equilibrium will exist under some simultaneous voting rule with a fixed voting threshold
value (p. 38, Lemma 2). However, our paper shows that if we explicitly take into account how
agents’ prior is shaped by public information, then the simultaneous voting rules commonly
used in practice may no longer suffice to incentivize agents to truthfully reveal their private
information via their votes. As another connection to our paper, Section 2 of Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996) extends their analysis to a case where agents have access to both private and
(exogenous) public information. They conclude that in such a setting, sincere voting, which is
equivalent to obedient voting in our model whenever the public information is more precise
than each agent’s private information, cannot be both informative and rational (p. 42, Theo-
rem 3). In contrast, we address the related but distinct question of whether informative voting
can be rational under some simultaneous voting rule when it is not required to be sincere.
Our model and focus are also quite different from the few other papers that study the effect of
public information in a voting environment (e.g., Gersbach, 2000; Taylor and Yildirim, 2010;
Tanner, 2014).
Several papers study the effect of pre-voting deliberation (e.g., Coughlan, 2000; Austen-
Smith and Feddersen, 2006; Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). In these models, agents can communi-
cate their private information before the vote takes place, thus public information endogenously
arises. Our model differs from them in two main aspects. First, in the models with delibera-
tion, conflicts between an agent’s private information and the public information usually do
not matter because the former has already been incorporated in the latter. In our model, how-
ever, such conflicts have a direct and profound effect on agents’ provision of private informa-
tion, which can lead to a severe loss of informational efficiency. Second, unlike in the obedient
voting equilibrium in the current paper, in these models it is actually socially efficient for the
agents to always follow the public information, conditional on their private information being
credibly revealed in the deliberation stage.3
Finally, there is a third strand of literature on committee design and optimal voting rules
3Buechel and Mechtenberg (2016) is a recent exception that shows that pre-voting communication can actu-
ally impede efficient information aggregation within a common-interest setting. They consider a network model
in which agents are heterogeneously informed, and each informed agent can privately make a voting recom-
mendation to the uninformed agents that are connected to her. They show that if the network structure is too
centralized around a few informed agents, majority voting may lead to inefficient information aggregation. Com-
pared to their paper, we focus on the public communication between a (strategic or non-strategic) information
controller and a group of homogeneously informed agents.
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with strategic agents.4 For example, Persico (2004) studies the optimal size and threshold value
for simultaneous voting rules when agents’ private information is endogenous. Subsequently,
Gershkov and Szentes (2009) show that when information is costly, the optimal direct mech-
anism can actually be implemented by a random, sequential reporting/voting scheme, which
suggests in general that the use of more flexible voting rules can be welfare-enhancing. This
insight is also shared by Gersbach (2004, 2009, 2017), who shows that allowing the voting
rule to depend on the proposal to be determined may yield efficient outcomes for classic social
choice problems such as provision of public projects and division of limited resources among
agents. More recently, Gershkov et al. (forthcoming) show that in an environment where agents
have single-crossing preferences, a successive voting rule with a descending threshold achieves
the highest utilitarian efficiency among all anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy
incentive-compatible mechanisms. Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that
when relevant public information is salient in the strategic environment being considered, the
voting rules should also be more carefully and flexibly designed in order to achieve a more
efficient outcome.
3 The Model
3.1 Players, actions and payoffs
Consider a committee of n members (agents) indexed by i ∈ I ≡ {1, ...,n}. We assume n is
odd and n ≥ 3. Agents need to make a collective decision d ∈ D ≡ {0,1} over a binary set of
alternatives. For concreteness, one could think of a setting in which a board of directors is
choosing between two business proposals.
Each agent can cast a vote to support one of the alternatives. We denote vi = 1 if agent
i votes in favor of the decision d = 1, and vi = 0 otherwise. A voting profile of the agents is
denoted by v = (v1, ..., vn) ∈ V ≡ {0,1}
n. For the moment, we restrict our attention to a class of
collective decision rules gk : V → D called k-voting rules, which are arguably most commonly
used in practice. Formally, if we set the alternative associated with d = 0 as the default option,
under the voting rule gk the alternative associated with d = 1 will be chosen if and only if there
4See Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2014) for the design of optimal collective decision
rules with non-strategic agents.
7
are at least k ∈ {1, ..,n} votes in favor of it: gk(v) = 1 if
∑n
i=1 vi ≥ k, and g
k(v) = 0 otherwise.
Each k-voting rule is uniquely characterized by its threshold value k. In particular, the simple
majority rule is given by k = (n+1)/2.
The state of the world θ is drawn from a binary setΘ ≡ {0,1}with equal probability.5 In the
context of the board of directors and business proposals, one could think of θ as the uncertain
(relative) quality of the two proposals, where θ = 1 means the proposal associated with d = 1
is of higher prospective revenue, while the other is better if θ = 0. We assume agent i’s utility
function ui :D×Θ→ R takes the following form (see also Coughlan, 2000; Kojima and Takagi,





















0 if d = θ,
−qi if d = 1,θ = 0,
−(1− qi) if d = 0,θ = 1,
where qi ∈ [0,1]. In words, we assume the agents in the committee have a common interest
in matching the collective decision to the state (i.e., choosing the proposal of higher quality),
and we normalize the payoff of successfully choosing d = θ to zero. However, we allow the
agents’ payoffs to differ when committing different types of decision errors. We also allow
these differences to be heterogeneous across agents. Each agent’s utility function is uniquely
characterized by the parameter qi , and the preference profile q = (qi)i∈I is common knowledge
among the agents. We interpret qi as a measure of how biased agent i is towards the default
option ex ante: If qi = 1/2, agent i is unbiased and indifferent between the two alternatives;
if qi < 1/2, agent i is inclined to choose d = 1; similarly, qi > 1/2 implies that agent i would
prefer d = 0 if there is no further information to be revealed. In addition, if qi , qj , the two
agents i and j may strictly prefer different alternatives even when they have exactly the same
information. Hence, we interpret qi , qj as a potential conflict of interest between the two
agents. We refer to the case where qi = 1/2 ∀i ∈ I as the setting where agents have purely
common interests.
5The assumptions that the prior probability of θ is uniform and that the accuracy of the agents’ private signals
is state-independent (see Section 3.2) are mainly made for the convenience of exposition. Most of our analysis can
be straightforwardly extended beyond the current setting. See, for example, how we prove Proposition 1 in
Section 4 more generally in the Appendix without the above two assumptions.
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Note that, given the above specification of payoffs, if agent i assigns a posterior probability
π ∈ [0,1] to the event θ = 1, she would prefer d = 1 over d = 0 if and only if π ≥ qi , that is,
whenever the evidence of the state being 1 is sufficiently strong.
3.2 Information structure and timing
Before casting their votes, each agent privately receives an i.i.d. signal si ∈ Si ≡ {0,1}, which is
drawn according to the conditional probability distribution Pr(si = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(si = 0|θ = 0) =
α ∈ (1/2,1). We denote s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S ≡Π
n
i=1Si as the agents’ (private) signal profile. In addi-
tion to their private signals, all agents commonly observe a public signal sp ∈ Sp ≡ {0,1}, which
is independently drawn from the conditional probability distribution Pr(sp = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(sp =
0|θ = 0) = β ∈ [1/2,1). We choose to model public information as an additional conditionally
independent signal mainly because it has a clear interpretation, especially when considering
committees of moderate sizes: In the context of the board of directors and business proposals,
for example, one can think of the public signal as the opinion expressed by the advisory board
to all directors before the vote takes place. If β > α, we can further interpret the public signal
as the advice provided to the committee by some external expert. In addition, this modeling
assumption allows us to conveniently extend our analysis to settings where the disclosure of
public information is strategically determined by a biased party (see Section 6). We will discuss
an alternative way to model public information when considering large elections in Section 4.1.
For later use, we define a measure of (relative) informativeness of the public signal:
r ≡
lnβ − ln(1− β)
lnα − ln(1−α)
. (3.1)
For given α and β the value of r is uniquely determined, and we will say that the public signal
is r-times as informative as a private signal. For example, if α = 0.6, then β = 0.55,0.69,0.77
correspond to the cases where the public signal is 0.5-, 2- and 3-times as informative as a
private signal, respectively. Intuitively, the measure r tells us how many private signals of
opposite realization would counter-balance the informational effect of the public signal.
The timing of the voting game is as follows. First, Natures draws θ. After that, each agent
observes her private signal and, in addition, the public signal. Agents then cast their votes,
and the collective decision d is determined according to the voting profile and the voting rule.
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Finally, the state is revealed and agents collect their payoffs.
3.3 Strategies and equilibrium
In the voting game, a strategy of agent i is a mapping σi : Si × Sp −→ [0,1], where σi(si , sp)
denotes the probability that agent i will vote vi = 1 when observing (si , sp). We will frequently
refer to the following two types of (pure) voting strategies (see also KV):
Definition 1. A strategy is informative if σi(si , sp) = si , ∀si ∈ Si , sp ∈ Sp.
Definition 2. A strategy is obedient if σi(si , sp) = sp, ∀si ∈ Si , sp ∈ Sp.
The informative strategy is interesting because it is simple and allows the agent to fully convey
her private information via her vote. In addition, as we will show in Section 5, the outcomes of
optimal voting mechanisms with public information can be indirectly implemented by voting
procedures that incentivize the agents to play the informative strategy. The obedient strategy
is interesting because it is also simple and it can be very appealing in a context where the
public signal is considered as a recommendation from someone supposed to be an expert on
the issue. The downside of this “follow-the-expert” strategy is that it entirely disregards the
agent’s private information, which is also informative about the state.6
We call a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all agents play the informative strategy an in-
formative voting equilibrium (IVE). Similarly, a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all agents play
the obedient strategy will be called an obedient voting equilibrium (OVE). For a given preference
profile q, if there exists a k-voting rule under which the IVE exists, we say that such a prefer-
ence profile allows for the existence of the informative voting equilibrium or simply allows for
informative voting.
In the absence of public information, if qi ∈ [1−α,α] ∀i ∈ I , it is easy to check that under the
simple majority rule the IVE exists and the CJT holds. If all agents are highly biased towards
one of the alternatives, we may still be able to sustain informative voting as an equilibrium by
using a threshold value different from (n+1)/2. For example, if qi ∈ [α,α
3/(α3+(1−α)3)] ∀i ∈ I ,
one can show that the IVE still exists in a voting game with the super-majority rule k = (n+3)/2,
6Nevertheless, provided it exists, the equilibrium in which all agents play the obedient strategy maximizes
the predicted accuracy of the collective decision among all symmetric equilibria in which the agents use a private-
information-independent voting strategy (i.e., σi (0, sp) = σi (1, sp) ∀sp ∈ Sp).
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and the CJT continues to hold as n becomes sufficiently large (Laslier and Weibull, 2013). In
fact, in all the above-mentioned cases the informative voting strategy profile also constitutes
an ex post Nash equilibrium (Cremer and McLean, 1985), since no agent would ever have a strict
incentive to revise her vote even if she could observe the whole voting profile. However, as
shown in the next section, the set of preferences that allow for informative voting may shrink
drastically in the presence of public information.
4 Inefficient Information Aggregation
To see how the presence of a public signal could affect the equilibrium outcome of the voting
game, we first provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the informative
voting equilibrium under any given k-voting rule:
Proposition 1. Given a k-voting rule, the informative voting equilibrium exists if and only if



































In the Appendix, we prove a more general version of Proposition 1 which allows the prior
probability of the state to be non-uniform and the accuracy of the private signals to be state-
dependent. By doing so, we generalize a similar result obtained by Wit (1998) for common-
interest voting games with majority rule.
To understand Proposition 1, first note that under a given k-voting rule, an agent is pivotal
only when there are exactly k−1 other agents who vote in favor of the decision d = 1, while the
remaining n − k agents choose to support the decision d = 0. Second, if agent i prefers to vote
according to her private signal even when it conflicts with the public signal, she will also prefer
to do so when the two signals agree. Assuming all other agents j , i follow the informative
voting strategy, for a given k-voting rule, the left (right) endpoint of the interval in (4.1) is
the posterior probability that a Bayesian agent i will assign to the event θ = 1 conditional on
si = 0, sp = 1 (si = 1, sp = 0) and being pivotal. Since a rational agent cares only about the cases in
which she is decisive about the final voting outcome, we can conclude that all qi lying between
the above two posterior probabilities is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
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the informative voting equilibrium under the given k-voting rule.
KV observe that if the public signal is more accurate than each of the private signals (β > α),
informative voting for agents who have purely common interests cannot constitute an equilib-
rium under the majority rule. The next two corollaries, which follow Proposition 1 imme-
diately, generalize this important observation to arbitrary precision of the public signal, the
whole class of k-voting rules, and a much larger set of preferences.
Corollary 1. Suppose β > α. For any threshold value k and any preference profile (qi)i∈I , the
informative voting equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 2. Suppose β ≤ α. The informative voting equilibrium does not exist under any k-voting













In words, Corollary 1 confirms that whenever the public signal is strictly more precise
than each of the private signals, it is impossible to obtain the informative voting equilibrium
under any k-voting rule.7 Meanwhile, Corollary 2 implies that even if the public signal is less
accurate, it is still hard to guarantee the existence of the informative voting equilibrium as
long as there are two or more agents who are sufficiently biased toward different alternatives
ex ante. Note that the required bias becomes arbitrarily small when β is close to α.
The intuition behind both corollaries can be understood via the following simple example of
three agents with heterogeneous preferences, such that q1 = 1−α, q2 = 1/2 and q3 = α. Assume
that the collective decision is made according to the majority rule (k = 2). In the absence of
public information, one can check that informative voting constitutes an equilibrium, even
though the first and third agents are biased toward different alternatives ex ante. Suppose now
agents also observe a public signal that is more informative than each of their private signals. If
the unbiased agent 2 assumes that the other two agents will vote informatively, she could infer
that the only situation in which she is pivotal is when agent 1 and 3 receive conflicting signals,
but this implies that the others’ private signals are collectively uninformative about the state.
7In general, in this case the strategy profile that the agents would vote for some alternative if and only if it
is supported by both private and public signals (while the other alternative is always chosen whenever the two
signals disagree) does not constitute an equilibrium either. This would be the case, for example, if ∀i ∈ I , qi ∈
[1 − α,α] and the simple majority rule is used. This is because that whenever an alternative is supported by the
more precise public signal, then conditional on all other agents would vote for that alternative if and only if it is
also supported by their own private signals, an agents whose private signal disagrees with the public signal would












Figure 1: The graphs of the correspondences Qα,k(β) given n = 3,α = 0.75.
Hence, in this case, agent 2 would make her voting decision by comparing the observed public
signal and her own private signal, and simply follows the public one because of its higher
precision. Conversely, suppose the public signal is less informative than the private signals.
While it is now rational for the unbiased agent 2 to vote informatively (assuming the other two
agents do so as well), this is not the case for the two biased agents. For example, agent 1 will
still strictly prefer to choose v1 = 1 if s1 = 0 and sp = 1, even when she assumes that the other
two agents are voting informatively. This is because the public signal, albeit less informative, is
still in favor of her preferred alternative. Moreover, this problem cannot be resolved by using
the unilateral (k = 1) or unanimity rule (k = 3) instead. For example, suppose all three agents
are unbiased and the public signal is just slightly more informative than the private signals.
While adopting the unanimity rule can successfully encourage agents to vote informatively
whenever sp = 0, it provides even stronger incentives for the agents to disregard their private
information whenever sp = 1.
Figure 1 interprets the above results graphically. Suppose for a given k-voting rule, an
agent i with qi will find it optimal to play the informative voting strategy when assuming that
all other agents j , i are voting informatively. Let Qα,k(β) ⊆ [0,1] denote the set of all such
qi , for given k, α and β. For a preference profile q, the informative voting equilibrium exists
under a given k-voting rule if and only if qi ∈ Q
α,k(β), ∀i ∈ I . For fixed parameter values n = 3
and α = 0.75, the top, middle, and bottom part of the gray area in Figure 1 corresponds to
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the graph of Qα,3(β), Qα,2(β) and Qα,1(β), respectively.8 As the precision of the public signal
increases, the size of each Qα,k(β) decreases. In particular, when β > α, Qα,k(β) = ∅,∀k = 1,2,3.
Besides shrinking the set of preference profiles that allow for informative voting, the pres-
ence of the public signal also opens the possibility for the agents to coordinate on the obedient
voting equilibrium. In fact, when 1 < k < n, the OVE always exists.9 Clearly, the OVE can be
highly inefficient, especially when the public signal is less accurate or just moderately more ac-
curate than each of the private signals.10 As a numerical example, suppose that n = 7, α = 0.6
and the simple majority rule is used. By introducing a public signal that is twice as informative
as each agent’s private signal (i.e., β = 0.69), the probability of reaching a correct decision can
actually decrease (from 0.71 to 0.69) if the agents are induced to switch to the OVE from the
IVE. In contrast, if instead we enlarge the size of the committee by two, then the predicted
accuracy will increase to 0.73 provided that the agents continue to coordinate on the IVE.11
4.1 Discussion
The informative voting equilibrium is desirable because it can aggregate potentially a large
amount of private information by asking the agents to play a simple and intuitive strategy that
requires little coordination. However, as pointed out by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997),
from a game-theoretic point of view the non-existence of the IVE does not necessarily imply a
failure of information aggregation. For example, suppose that β > α, 1 < k < n and qi , qj for
some i, j ∈ I . In this case, the IVE does not exist and the OVE is the most efficient equilibrium
among the ones that are symmetric (with respect to both the agents and the realization of the
public signal), even if the heterogeneous preference profile q would have allowed for infor-
mative voting in the absence of the public signal. However, one cannot generally exclude the
existence of asymmetric equilibria, which may efficiently incorporate both public and private
information in a more sophisticated way (e.g., by asking agents to play idiosyncratic mixed
8For every α ∈ (1/2,1], Qα,k(1/2) corresponds to the set of preferences that allow for informative voting under
the given k-voting rule when the public signal is absent.













10For such inefficient use of private information to arise as an equilibrium outcome, it suffices to have more
than n0 ≡max{k +1,n− k +1} agents who follow the obedient voting strategy.
11Suppose that the IVE exists given the preference profile of the original seven-member committee. Then, the
IVE also exists after the size of the committee is increased if the preferences of the newmembers do not exaggerate
the initial maximal degree of conflict of interest in the committee (see Proposition 4).
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strategies).12
Despite the above theoretical possibility, we argue that there are still important reasons for
the concern of public information being detrimental. First, the coordination required from
the agents in asymmetric equilibria (especially the ones in mixed strategies) can be highly so-
phisticated. In particular, with asymmetric strategy profiles it can be extremely cognitively
challenging for the agents to draw statistical inferences from pivotality. As Esponda and Vespa
(2014) demonstrate in their voting experiment, human subjects often have difficulties extract-
ing information from hypothetically pivotal events even when they are playing with computers
that are programmed to play symmetric strategies. This makes the prediction of asymmetric
equilbria rather unappealing. In contrast, the OVE requires very little sophisticated coordina-
tion from the agents. This may be an important reason for the OVE to be an attractive focal
point, especially when the IVE does not exist. In fact, for the important benchmark case of
unbiased agents, KV present strong experimental evidence showing that a large proportion of
voters tend to follow the public signal instead of their private signals much more frequently
than other equilibria would predict.13 Consequently, the collective decisions coincided with
what the public signal suggested most of the time. This confirms empirically that the presence
of a public signal can indeed lead to a substantial welfare loss.
Second, although in the current setting asymmetric equilibria may indeed lead to informa-
tion aggregation as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), such a result would not be robust once
we relax the assumption on how the public and the private information are being observed by
the agents. This would be the case, for example, if we instead assume that each agent only
observes a correlated signal ŝi = si + sp. To illustrate this more formally, first note that so far
we have modeled public information as an additional conditionally independent signal that is
perfectly observed by all agents. This is equivalent to the assumption that each agent privately
observes a correlated signal ŝi = si + ηsp with η > 1, as the agents can perfectly back out the
signal profile (si , sp) from the realization of ŝi . This assumption fits into applications with com-
mittees of moderate size (e.g. boards of directors, hiring committees, juries), since typically
12Note that we cannot use the general results from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) to conclude that in-
formation will be perfectly aggregated as the size of committee increases either. This is because Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997) assume that all observed signals are conditionally independent between agents.
13In their setting, in addition to the obedient voting equilibrium KV also identify a symmetric equilibrium
in which the agents play mixed strategies whenever the public signal disagrees with their private ones, and an
asymmetric equilibrium in which only a small subset of the agents vote obediently.
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in these scenarios not only the public information itself but also its source is clear (e.g., the
expert invited to the board meeting, the reference letters submitted to the hiring committees,
the witnesses testify in the court). However, this assumption may not capture very well what
happen in large elections (i.e., large size committees), where information often comes from
multiple sources and is transmitted in a more decentralized way. In that case, an agent may
find it difficult to tell for sure what is publicly known from what is her private knowledge.
Nevertheless, this can be captured by our more general model with correlated signals: Letting
η = 1, an agent becomes uncertain about what is publicly known when she observes ŝi = 1.
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Despite this, assuming β ≥ α, from an individual agent’s point of view the correlated signal ŝi is
actually more precise than the independent signal si , since the expected conditional variances
satisfy E[Var(θ|ŝi)] < E[Var(θ|si)].
Having the above-mentioned general setting in mind, let us fix an arbitrary sequence of
preference profiles {qn = (q1, ..., qn)}n∈N. We say that {σ
kn}n∈N is a sequence of equilibria in-
duced by a sequence of k-voting rules {gkn}n∈N if ∀ n ∈ N, σ
kn constitutes an equilibrium under
the voting rule gkn . We say that a sequence of k-voting rules {gkn}n∈N aggregates information
asymptotically if (i) it admits a subsequence {gkn(τ)}τ∈N such that limτ→∞ kn(τ)/n(τ) = κ ∈ [0,1],
and (ii) {gkn(τ)}τ∈N induces a sequence of equilibria in which the probability of reaching a cor-
rect decision goes to one. The next result shows that even in large elections, making agents’
observations correlated by providing public information can have profound ramifications for
information aggregation.
Proposition 2. Suppose that each agent only observes a correlated signal ŝi = si + sp. For any
sequence of preference profiles, there exists no sequence of k-voting rules that aggregates information
asymptotically.
In sum, unlike endowing voters with better private information, introducing public infor-
mation may actually worsen the quality of the collective decision. This is similar to one of
the most striking findings in the global games literature, namely the heterogeneous effect of
public and private information. For instance, in a highly influential paper, Morris and Shin
(2002) show that in a setting where agents’ actions are strategic complements, additional pub-
14While the case η = 1 may seem to be non-generic, this is largely due to the binary structure of the signals in
our model. If, for example, both si and sp are continuously distributed over [0,1], then no η can guarantee that an
agent will always be able to perfectly back out both si and sp from the signal ŝi = si + ηsp .
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lic information can have negative social value. Although agents in the current setting have
no intrinsic motive of coordination, our results suggest similarly that the conventional wis-
dom that additional information is always beneficial for decision-makers should be carefully
examined.15
5 Optimal Voting Mechanisms
In this section, we study the design of optimal voting mechanisms with public information.
We will show that the outcomes of the optimal mechanisms can be indirectly implemented by
simple voting procedures that incorporate the public information appropriately. For clarity of
exposition, we will maintain the assumption that the public signal is exogenous throughout
this section. We will illustrate in Section 6 that our new voting procedures have also additional
advantages when strategic information disclosure is a non-negligible concern.
By the revelation principle, we consider only direct mechanisms f : S × Sp → [0,1]. The
interpretation is that for every signal profile (s, sp) ∈ S × Sp the mechanism specifies the proba-
bility f (s, sp) that the alternative associated with d = 1 will be chosen. We start by introducing
several definitions.
Definition 3. A mechanism f is anonymous if ∀sp ∈ Sp and ∀s, s
′ ∈ S such that s is a permutation
of s′, f (s, sp) = f (s
′, sp).
Definition 4. A mechanism f is ex post incentive compatible if ∀sp ∈ Sp, ∀s−i ∈ S−i , ∀si , s
′
i ∈ Si
and ∀i ∈ I , E
[






i , s−i , sp),θ)|si , s−i , sp
]
.
Definition 5. Amechanism f is responsive (to private information) if ∀sp ∈ Sp, there exist s, s
′ ∈ S
such that f (s, sp) , f (s
′, sp).
Anonymity requires the mechanism to treat every agent’s report equally. It is a common
constraint imposed on voting mechanisms. The notion of ex post incentive compatibility
(EPIC) requires every agent to prefer truth-telling at every signal profile (s, sp) if all the other
15The non-beneficial effect of public information also resembles the finding from the rational herding literature
(e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). In the models studied in this literature, public information arises
endogenously as observed actions taken by previous agents. However, agents who arrive in the future need not
be able to fully learn about the state from public observables, as herds or information cascades may arise in
equilibrium.
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agents also report truthfully. Similar to the role of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility
in private-value environments, EPIC guarantees robust behavior of agents in interdependent-
value environments (Bergemann andMorris, 2005). Trivially, an anonymous and ex post incen-
tive compatible (A-EPIC) mechanism exists: The mechanism fo with fo(s, sp) = sp∀(s, sp) ∈ S ×Sp
satisfies both anonymity and ex post incentive compatibility. However, fo is not a responsive
mechanism as it makes no use of the agents’ reports. By matching the realization of the public
signal, it replicates the outcome of the obedient voting equilibrium discussed in Section 4. We
are interested in finding an optimal A-EPIC mechanism, i.e., one that maximizes the probabil-
ity of the collective decision being matched to the state among all A-EPIC mechanisms.
We next introduce a new class of voting rules gk0,k1 : V → D that we call contingent k-voting
rules, which can be obtained by adjusting the standard k-voting rules in an intuitive way. In
particular, the threshold values in such voting rules will be no longer fixed but a function of













k0 if sp = 0,
k1 if sp = 1,
(5.1)
where k0, k1 ∈ {0,1, ...,n + 1}. Any standard k-voting rule amounts to a special case of the con-
tingent k-voting rules with k0 = k1 ∈ {1, ...,n}. We say that a contingent k-voting rule g
k0,k1 is
responsive if k0, k1 < {0,n + 1}. We also say that the voting rule g
k0,k1 implements informative
voting if it can sustain the informative voting strategy profile as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in the corresponding voting game. Finally, the voting rule gk0,k1 is said to be equivalent to a
A-EPIC mechanism f if, for every realization of the signals (s, sp), the probability of reaching
the correct decision is the same in both the informative voting equilibrium sustained by gk0,k1
and the truth-telling equilibrium sustained by f . Our next result states that in the search for
optimal A-EPIC mechanisms, it is without loss to focus on contingent k-voting rules that can
implement informative voting.
Proposition 3. For every optimal A-EPIC mechanism f , there exists a contingent k-voting rule
that is equivalent to f . In addition, the equivalent contingent k-voting rule is responsive if and only
if f is responsive.
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Given Proposition 3, the search for optimal mechanisms with public information is reduced
to choosing two threshold values k0, k1 ∈ {0,1, ...,n + 1}. It would be optimal to choose the ex-
treme threshold values k0 = n+1 and k1 = 0, for example, if the degree of conflicts of interests
in the committee is so large that the only available A-EPIC mechanisms are the non-responsive
ones with f (s, sp) = f (s
′, sp) ∀s, s
′ ∈ S and ∀sp ∈ Sp. While these A-EPIC mechanisms and their
equivalent contingent k-voting rules can incorporate the public information, they disregard all
the information privately held by the agents. Hence, provided that a responsive A-EPIC mech-
anism exists, there can be an efficiency gain by using its equivalent and responsive contingent
k-voting rule to further incorporate the agents’ private information. It also seems intuitive
that such an efficiency gain should be increasing in the size of the committee. Hence, one may
conjecture that a responsive contingent k-voting rule is optimal when the size of the commit-
tee is sufficiently large. To formalize and prove this conjecture, we introduce the notion of
conflict-preserving expansion: Let q = (q1, ..., qn) be a preference profile with q̄ ≡ maxi∈I qi and
q ≡mini∈I qi . We say that a sequence of preference profiles {q
τ = (q̂1, ..., q̂n+2τ)}τ∈◆ is a conflict-
preserving expansion of q if ∀qτ , q̄τ ≡ maxj∈{1,...,n+2τ} q̂j ≤ q̄ and q
τ ≡ minj∈{1,...,n+2τ} q̂j ≥ q. In
words, an expansion of the committee is conflict-preserving if it does not exaggerate the initial
maximal degree of conflict of interest. We are now ready to state the main result of this section,
which demonstrates the optimality of responsive contingent k-voting rules.
Proposition 4. Suppose that, for a given preference profile q with q, q̄ ∈ (0,1), there exists a re-
sponsive contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1 that implements informative voting. Then, for any conflict-
preserving expansion {qτ}τ∈◆ of q:




1 that implements informa-
tive voting. This contingent k-voting rule is unique if q̄τ , qτ , and the corresponding threshold
values are given by kτ0 = k0 + τ and k
τ
1 = k1 + τ.
(ii) There exists τ∗, such that ∀τ ≥ τ∗ there exists a responsive contingent k-voting rule that is
equivalent to an optimal A-EPIC mechanism.
(iii) As τ →∞, the ex ante probability of the collective decision being matched to the state in the
informative voting equilibrium under any responsive contingent k-voting rule becomes arbi-
trarily close to 1.
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We thus obtain a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for the contingent k-voting rules in
a general voting environment with both private and public information. In particular, Propo-
sition 4 implies that the complete-information outcome can be asymptotically achieved if we
incorporate the public information into the voting procedure appropriately. In addition, for
finite but large n, no equilibrium under any other A-EPIC mechanism may outperform the
informative voting equilibrium under a responsive contingent k-voting rule.
Proposition 4 shows that it is often desirable to use a responsive contingent k-voting rule
to implement informative voting. Our next result characterizes when such a practice would be
feasible.
Proposition 5. For a given preference profile qwith q̄, q ∈ (0,1), there exists a responsive contingent
k-voting rule that implements informative voting if and only if there exist integers k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n}
such that




















































































































































Importantly, there are cases where allowing the threshold to be contingent on the realization
of the public signal is necessary for implementing informative voting. To see this, consider a
simple example with n = 5 and qi = 1/2,∀i ∈ I . If there is no public signal, the informative
voting equilibrium exists under the simple majority rule. Now let us introduce a public signal
that is twice as informative as a private signal. By Corollary 1, this implies that the informative
voting equilibrium no longer exists under any k-voting rule. However, consider the contingent
k-voting rule with k0 = 4 and k1 = 2. Suppose all agents j , i are voting informatively. If
sp = 1, agent i is pivotal only when three of the other agents draw sj = 0 and the remaining one
draws sj = 1. Given the above assumption on the informativeness of the public signal, these
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private signals are collectively uninformative about the state when they are combined with
the realization of the public signal. Thus, voting according to her own private signal is a best
response for agent i. Similarly, if sp = 0, agent i is pivotal under the contingent k-voting rule
only when there are three private signals in favor of d = 1 and one in favor of d = 0 among all
others’ private signals. Again, the collective informational effect of all sj , j , i, will be exactly
counterbalanced by the fact that sp = 0, which makes it optimal for agent i to simply follow her
own signal. Intuitively, what we are doing here is to vary the information that agents can infer
from pivotality. Under the contingent k-voting rule chosen in the above example, an agent
is pivotal when and only when the private signals of the other agents are collectively more
against the alternative favored by the public signal. This restores the incentive for agents to
vote according to their own signals.
While both (π00)
−1 and (π10)
−1 are strictly increasing in q̄, both (π01)
−1 and (π11)
−1 are strictly
increasing in q. Hence, it is possible that both of the intervals K0 and K1 contain no integer
if q̄ is sufficiently larger than q. Intuitively, if the degree of conflict of interest between the
agents is too large, it is very difficult to find a responsive voting rule that ensures the incentive
for all agents to vote informatively, even if we allow the voting threshold value to be flexibly
contingent on the public signal. Nevertheless, we are able to show that for the important
limiting cases where agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1998; Persico, 2004; Koriyama and Szentes, 2009), there always exists a responsive contingent
k-voting rule that implements informative voting, provided that the size of the committee is
sufficiently large:
Corollary 3. Suppose that ∀i ∈ I , qi = q ∈ (0,1). There exists n̄(q), such that for each n ≥ n̄(q),
there exists a responsive contingent k-voting rule that implements informative voting.
5.1 Contingent majority rule
In this subsection, we provide further analysis of optimal voting mechanisms for the setting
where agents have purely common interests, i.e., qi = 1/2 ∀i ∈ I . This important benchmark
setting has been extensively studied in the literature. Especially, KV show that in this setting
if the public signal is r-times as informative as a private signal, where r ≤ (n−1)/2, then under
the simple majority rule there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which r∗ = N ∩ (r − 1, r]
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agents obey the public signal, while the remaining n− r∗ agents vote according to their private
signals. This r∗-asymmetric equilibrium is shown to be more efficient than both the obedient
voting equilibrium and the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, as well as all other
asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the same voting game. In the following, we will show
in the same setting that one can always construct a responsive contingent k-voting rule that
not only implements informative voting, but also leads to strictly higher efficiency than the
r∗-asymmetric equilibrium.


























if sp = 1,
where [(r−1)/2]+ denotes the smallest integer that is larger or equal to (r−1)/2. For convenience,
we will call this rule the contingent majority rule. Note that the contingent majority rule is
responsive whenever r ≤ n. The following result justifies our focus on this particular contingent
k-voting rule:
Corollary 4. Suppose that r ≤ n. The contingent majority rule implements informative voting if
and only if





































Since |r − 2[(r − 1)/2]+| ∈ [0,1] for all r ≥ 0, we always have 1/2 ∈ Qcm(r). Therefore, for the
case where all agents are unbiased, one can always use the contingent majority rule to imple-
ment informative voting.16 The next proposition further shows that the informative voting
equilibrium under the contingent majority rule achieves the first-best informational efficiency.
Proposition 6. Given all the information that is available to the committee, the probability of the
collective decision being matched to the state is maximized in the informative voting equilibrium
under the contingent majority rule.
16The contingent majority rule is also the unique responsive contingent k-voting rule that implements infor-
mative voting except when r happens to be is an odd integer.
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To gain some intuition, consider a simple example of n = 5 and r = 2. Assume all agents
are unbiased. Imagine that we introduce two additional phantom agents on top of the existing
five real agents. These phantom agents are programmed so that they simply vote in line with
the public signal. Suppose now the simple majority rule is used to decide which alternative
will be chosen. One can easily show that (1) all real agents voting informatively constitutes
an equilibrium in this game (despite that the public signal observed by the agents is more
precise than each of their private ones), (2) the equilibrium outcome is identical to that of
the informative voting equilibrium under the contingent majority rule without the phantom
agents, and (3) the equilibrium outcome maximizes the probability that the decision will be
matched to the state, given all the available information. Intuitively, by allowing the threshold
value to be dependent on the public signal and by encouraging agents to vote informatively,
the contingent majority rule aggregates both the private and the public information efficiently.
On the contrary, in the r∗-asymmetric equilibrium, inefficiency still prevails because there
are r∗ agents who always disregard their valuable private information. To see this issue more
clearly, consider again the above example. Since in this case we have r∗ = 2 = (n−1)/2, under the
simple majority rule there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which two agents play the obe-
dient strategy, while the remaining three agents vote informatively. Without loss of generality,
assume the first two agents are the obedient voters. Consider the signal profile s = (1,1,0,1,1)
and sp = 0. In equilibrium, such a realization of signals will lead to a collective decision d = 0.
However, from a benevolent social planner’s point of view, given all the available information,
the welfare maximizing decision should be d = 1. Therefore, the r∗-asymmetric equilibrium is
strictly less efficient than the first-best.
5.2 Implementation with two-stage voting
The analysis of contingent k-voting rules has highlighted the importance, especially in terms of
the potential efficiency gain, of having a more flexible voting procedure that can appropriately
incorporate the content of the public information. In practice, however, it might be difficult
to implement (or even just prespecify) a voting rule that is contingent on some public infor-
mation, especially when the source of the relevant public information is ambiguous ex ante.
In this subsection, we introduce a simple two-stage voting mechanism that is immune to such
concerns.
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The voting rule is as follows. After observing the private and the public signals, the agents
first vote to select an integer k ∈ {0,1, ...,n + 1}. The integer k∗ that receives the most votes will
be selected, with ties being broken randomly. In the second stage, the agents vote about which
collective decision to take according to the voting rule gk
∗
, i.e., d = 1 if and only if
∑n
i=1 vi ≥ k
∗.
Practically, this two-stage voting procedure is more appealing than the contingent k-voting
rules because the procedure itself is deterministic and independent of the informational details
of the environment.
Fix a preference profile q, and suppose that there exists a contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1
that implements informative voting. We say that the above two-stage voting mechanism can
equivalently implement the informative voting equilibrium under gk0,k1 , if in the two-stage vot-
ing game there exists a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the agents first collectively
vote to agree on the threshold value that would have been chosen by gk0,k1 , and then they vote
informatively in the second stage.
Proposition 7. Suppose that, for a given preference profile q, there exists a contingent k-voting rule
gk0,k1 that implements informative voting. Then, the two-stage voting mechanism can equivalently
implement the informative voting equilibrium under gk0,k1 .
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is simple: Since the voting threshold k∗ is determined
by a simple plurality rule, no agent could unilaterally change the voting outcome in the first
stage if all other agents agree to choose either k0 or k1. But then given that the informative
voting strategy profile constitutes an ex post Nash equilibrium under gk0,k1 , no agent would
have the incentive to deviate from informative voting in the second stage either, no matter how
she updates her beliefs about the state and other agents’ private information after observing
the voting outcome of the first stage.
We close this section by noting that the use of the plurality rule for determining the voting
threshold is not generally necessary for our result. To see this, suppose, for example, that
the agents have purely common interests and the following unanimity rule is used in the first
stage: If all agents agree to use some k ∈ {0,1, ...,n+1}, then we let k∗ = k. Otherwise, the simple
majority rule will be used, i.e., k∗ = (n+1)/2. This alternative two-stage voting mechanism can
also equivalently implement the informative voting equilibrium under the contingent majority
rule. The reason is that, according to Proposition 6, the expected social welfare is maximized
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when the voting threshold values of the contingent majority rule are used. Since each agent’s
interest is perfectly aligned with the social welfare, any deviation in the first stage will only
yield a lower expected payoff to an agent.
6 Strategic Information Disclosure
In this section, we drop the assumption that the disclosure of public information is exogenous,
and consider it to be strategically determined by a possibly biased information controller (e.g.,
an external expert). As illustrated in Section 4, public information can have a huge influence on
the committee’s decision when the standard simultaneous voting rules are in use. Taking this
into account, a biased controller may only publicly reveal his information to the agents when
its content is in support of his favored alternative. For example, an advisory board member
who has private interests in the targeted firm may withhold unfavorable information from the
directory board when the acquisition decision is beingmade. In what follows, wewill formalize
this intuition by extending our baseline model from Section 3. In addition, we will show that
using a contingent voting rule adapted from the ones constructed in Section 5 can mitigate the
controller’s incentive for strategic disclosure and his influence on the voting outcome, which
in turn improves the efficiency of the collective decision.17
Suppose now that the signal sp described in Section 3.2 is no longer public by default but
can only be observed by an information controller with some probability. Specifically, with
probability λ ∈ (0,1), the controller is uninformed and can only send a public message m = ∅
(remain silent) to the agents. With the complementary probability 1−λ, the controller observes
the signal and can decide whether to publicly communicate its content to the agents or not.
While we allow the controller to withhold his information, we assume that the signal is hard
information and hence cannot be faked. In other words, in the latter case the public message
m can only be chosen from the set {sp,∅}.
Assume for simplicity that qi = 1/2 ∀i ∈ I and that the collective decision is made according
to the simple majority rule.18 Note again that in this case, the informative voting equilibrium
exists if no additional public information is available to the committee members. Assume also
17The same result will also hold if we use the two-stage voting mechanism (see Section 5.2) instead.
18With the general results in Sections 4 and 5, our analysis in the current section can be straightforwardly
extended to settings with general preference profiles and voting rules.
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that the controller has the same form of utility function as the agents, and his bias parameter is
given by qc ∈ [0,1]. Let λ̂ =max{0, (β−α)/(β−(1−α)}. The following proposition establishes that
if agents update their beliefs sufficiently little upon observing silence (i.e., λ is large enough),
a biased information controller may indeed exploit the publicity of his message and reveal his
information selectively.
Proposition 8. Suppose λ ≥ λ̂. There exists q̂ ∈ [1 − β,1/2] such that if qc ≤ q̂ (qc ≥ 1 − q̂), then
there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the controller sends m = sp if and only if he observes
sp = 1 (sp = 0), and the agents vote obediently if m = sp and informatively if m = ∅.
As a numerical example, if n = 3, α = 0.65 and β = 0.7, the threshold values are given by
λ̂ ≈ 0.14 and q̂ ≈ 0.48, respectively. Depending on the relative precision of the signals, the
informational efficiency of the committee’s decision could be improved if there were more or
less information disclosure than that in the equilibrium. For instance, the decision will be more
accurate in the above numerical example if the controller always keeps silent and just lets the
agents credibly coordinate on informative voting in the voting stage.
Some recent papers look at the question how an information controller can optimally per-
suade uninformed agents by designing the informational content of a public signal (e.g., Wang,
2015; Alonso and Câmara, 2016; Bardhi and Guo, 2017). In our model, voters are privately in-
formed and the controller has control over the disclosure of the public signal only. Hence, our
environment is notably less favorable for the controller. Nevertheless, Proposition 8 suggests
that the strategic incentive of the controller and his impact on the committee’s decision still
cannot be ignored.19
Fortunately, the concern of strategic information disclosure can be mitigated by instead
19This result does not necessarily hold, however, if the controller himself is also a member of the committee.
This is because other members in the committee may anticipate that the information contained in the controller’s
message will already be incorporated in his vote. For example, suppose that the controller is agent 1, qi = 1/2
∀i = 2, ...,n, β ≥ α and the simple majority rule is used. One can check that if qc ∈ [1 − β,β] and r < 2, then
regardless of whether the controller reveals his signal to the other agents or not in the communication stage, it
will be incentive compatible for all agents including the controller to vote informatively in the voting stage . This
example suggests that the public information emerges from pre-voting deliberations is less likely to threaten the
existence of the informative voting equilibrium. We cannot, however, conclude from this that there is no value
in pre-voting deliberations, because informative voting per se does not necessarily lead to the efficient outcome
under other voting rules (e.g. the unanimity rule).
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if m = 1.
Proposition 9. Suppose r ≤ n and the proposed contingent voting rule is used. There exists q∗ ∈
[0,1− β] such that
1. If qc ∈ [q
∗,1 − q∗], there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the controller sends m = sp
whenever he is informed, and the agents always vote informatively.
2. If qc ≤ q
∗ (qc ≥ 1− q
∗) and λ ≥ λ̂, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the controller
sendsm = sp if and only if he observes sp = 1 (sp = 0), and the agents always vote informatively.
By comparing Propositions 8 and 9, we can see that the contingent voting rule has two
main advantages over the simple majority rule. First, the contingent voting rule incorporates
the informational content in the controller’s message appropriately and makes it credible for
the agents to coordinate on informative voting in the voting stage. Hence, by the same rea-
soning as in Proposition 6, the decision selected by the contingent voting rule is most likely to
match the state, given all the information that is available to the committee, independent of
the controller’s disclosure policy and the relative precision of the signals. Second, under the
contingent voting rule the controller also has a higher incentive to share his information un-
conditionally, since he anticipates that his message will not have a direct impact on the agents’
voting behavior and will always help increase the accuracy of the committee’s decision. Indeed,
for the previous numerical example (n = 3, α = 0.65 and β = 0.7), we have q∗ ≈ 0.23, which is
substantially smaller than q̂.
7 Conclusion
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we show in a general setting of collective
decision-making that the provision of public information can have a detrimental effect on the
efficiency of the committee decision. The inefficient equilibrium outcome is consistent with
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experimental evidence, and it echos the common concern that expert opinions may have ex-
cessive influence on (both individual and collective) decision-making. We believe these results
to be of high policy relevance, especially since the immense influence of public information
may be strategically exploited by a biased information controller.
Second, we propose simple voting procedures that can indirectly implement the outcomes
of optimal anonymous and ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. By appropriately in-
corporating the public information and providing incentives for the agents to vote informa-
tively, our voting procedures facilitate information aggregation and enhance the accuracy of
the collective decision. By reducing the direct effect of public information on the agents’ vot-
ing behavior, the proposed voting procedures also mitigate the concern of strategic information
disclosure.
It should be remarked that our results are not suggesting that experts should be discouraged
from providing their expertise to decision makers. For example, besides providing additional
information, advice from experts may also help decision makers to better assess the situation
based on their private knowledge (i.e., the precision of the private signals α increases). In-
tuitively, this effect should be beneficial for increasing the probability of reaching the correct
decision. Therefore, we would like to highlight that the key message of this paper is that in
a voting environment with both private and public information, the voting procedure matters
and the optimal voting rule should reflect the content of the public information. For example,
if the advisory board indicates that one of the business proposals is more promising than the
other, it might be desirable for the board of directors to set up a voting rule that is more in
favor of the acceptance of that proposal. The design of optimal mechanisms in more general




Proof of Proposition 1
We prove a more general version of Proposition 1 by allowing the prior distribution of the state
to be non-uniform and the accuracy of the private signals to be state-dependent. Specifically,
we assume Pr(θ = 0) = 1−Pr(θ = 1) = π ∈ (0,1), and each of the private signals is independently
drawn according to the conditional probability distribution characterized by Pr(si = 0|θ = 0) =
α0 and Pr(si = 1|θ = 1) = α1, where α0,α1 ∈ (1/2,1). The results in the main text will then follow
by letting π = 1/2 and α0 = α1 = α.
For every signal profile s = (s1, ..., sn), let ms =
∑n
i=1 si . As an auxiliary result, note that con-
ditional on observing the whole profile of private signals and the public signal, the posterior
belief π(s, sp) that a Bayesian agent would assign to the event θ = 1 is given by:
π(s, sp) =
Pr(s, sp |θ = 1)Pr(θ = 1)










































where the first equality follows from Bayes rule and the second equality follow from the inde-
pendence assumption of the signals.
We will show that under a given k-voting rule gk , the informative voting equilibrium exists
if and only if















































Suppose all agents j , i play vj(sj , sp) = sj . Firstly, note that if vi(1,0) = 1 is rational for
agent i, so is vi(1,1) = 1; similarly, if vi(0,1) = 0 is rational for agent i, so is vi(0,0) = 0. Hence,
we only need to consider the optimality of the informative voting strategy in the cases where
si , sp. Secondly, agent i is decisive when and only when there are k − 1 agents who observe
a positive signal (sj = 1) and each of the remaining n − k agents observes an opposite signal
(sj = 0). Therefore, given si = 1, sp = 0 and being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i
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Similarly, given si = 0, sp = 1 and being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i assigns to
















Hence, to have informative voting as an equilibrium, it is both necessary and sufficient to have




1]. By letting π = 1/2 and α0 = α1 = α, we immediately obtain condition
(4.1).
Proof of Corollary 1
Note that the interval [π10,π
0














































If the accuracy of the private signals is state-independent, i.e., α0 = α1 = α, (A.1) is further
equivalent to α ≥ β.
Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose that π = 1/2, α0 = α1 = α and there exists a k-voting rule under which the informative
voting equilibrium exists. According to the proof of Proposition 1, the preferences of agents i
and j must satisfy
















































































Clearly, (A.3) and (A.4) are mutually exclusive. Hence, we can conclude that the informative
voting equilibrium does not exist under any k-voting rule.
Proof of Proposition 2
Given that each agent i observes ŝi = si + sp, we let Ŝi ≡ {0,1,2} be each agent’s signal space.
Therefore, agent i’s strategy is now a mapping σi : Ŝi → [0,1], where σi(ŝi) denotes the proba-
bility that agent i will vote vi = 1 when observing ŝi ∈ Ŝi .
Fix an arbitrary sequence of preference profiles {qn}n∈N. Suppose, in contradiction, that
there exists a sequence of k-voting rules that aggregates information asymptotically, where
{gkn(τ)}τ∈N and {σ
kn(τ)}τ∈N are the corresponding convergent subsequences of voting rules and
equilibria, and limτ→∞ kn(τ)/n(τ) = κ ∈ [0,1]. Since for any agent i her posterior belief about
the state being 1 is strictly increasing in ŝi , we must have for all i ∈ {1, ...,n(τ)} and for all
τ ∈ N, σ
kn(τ)
i (0) ≤ σ
kn(τ)
i (1) ≤ σ
kn(τ)
i (2). Let Y
τ ≡
∑n(τ)
i=1 vi . For each τ ∈ N, we can decompose the


































∣Y τ < kn(τ),θ, sp
]
.
Now consider the case θ = 1 and sp = 0, which occurs with probability (1 − β)/2 > 0. In
this case, along the sequence of the equilibria σkn(τ) agent i will cast the right vote (vi = 1) with
probability ασ
kn(τ)
i (1) + (1−α)σ
kn(τ)






















Thus, for the probability of reaching the right decision (d = 1) converging to 1 along this path,
that is Pr
(
Y τ ≥ kn(τ)
∣
∣
∣θ = 1, sp = 0
)











Y τ |Y τ ≥ kn(τ),θ = 1, sp = 0
]
.
Together with the monotonicity condition σ
kn(τ)
i (0) ≤ σ
kn(τ)













Next, consider the case θ = 0 and sp = 1, which also occurs with probability (1 − β)/2 > 0.
In this case, along the sequence of the equilibria σkn(τ) agent i will cast the right vote (vi = 0)
with probability α(1 − σ
kn(τ)
i (1)) + (1 − α)(1 − σ
kn(τ)
i (2)). Hence, similar the previous case, for
the probability of reaching the right decision (d = 0) converging to 1 along this path, that is,
Pr
(
Y τ < kn(τ)
∣
∣
∣θ = 0, sp = 1
)















≤ (α − 1) +κ. (A.6)
Since α < 1, (A.5) and (A.6) cannot hold simultaneously. We thus reach a contradiction.
Therefore, ex ante there must be some non-vanishing probability that the committee will reach
a wrong decision even its size becomes arbitrarily large. In other words, no sequence of k-
voting rules can aggregate information asymptotically.
Proof of Proposition 3
We first establish a lemma that fully characterizes ex post incentive compatibility.
Lemma A1. A mechanism f is ex post incentive compatible if and only if ∀s−i ∈ S−i , ∀sp ∈ Sp and
∀i ∈ I ,
(i) f (1, s−i , sp) ≥ f (0, s−i , sp), and
(ii) π(0, s−i , sp) > qi or π(1, s−i , sp) < qi =⇒ f (0, s−i , sp) = f (1, s−i , sp).
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Proof of Lemma A1. Given the specification of the agents’ payoff functions, the ex post incen-
tive compatibility constraints can be equivalently rewritten as follows:
(
f (si , s−i , sp)− f (s
′
i , s−i , sp)
)(
π(si , s−i , sp)− qi
)
≥ 0, (A.7)
for all si , s
′
i ∈ Si , s−i ∈ S−i , sp ∈ Sp and i ∈ I , where π(si , s−i , sp) is interpreted as agent i’s posterior
belief about the event θ = 1 after she knows that the actual signal profile is (si , s−i , sp). The
sufficiency part of the lemma then immediately follows.
Let us now prove the necessity part. For (i), suppose, in contradiction, that there exist some
i ∈ I , s−i ∈ S−i and sp ∈ Sp such that f (0, s−i , sp) > f (1, s−i , sp). By (A.7), we must have
π(1, s−i , sp)− qi ≤ 0 ≤ π(0, s−i , sp)− qi ,
which contradicts to π(1, s−i , sp) > π(0, s−i , sp). Hence, we have f (1, s−isp) ≥ f (0, s−i , sp) ∀si , s
′
i ∈ Si ,
s−i ∈ S−i , sp ∈ Sp and i ∈ I . To prove (ii), note that together with (A.7) either π(0, s−i , sp) > qi
or π(1, s−i , sp) < qi would imply that f (0, s−i , sp)− f (1, s−i , sp) ≥ 0. By implication (i) of EPIC, we
further have f (0, s−i , sp) = f (1, s−1, sp).
In our setting, it is straightforward to check that anonymity is equivalent to requiring that
∀sp ∈ Sp and ∀s, s
′ ∈ S , ms = ms′ implies f (s, sp) = f (s
′, sp). Therefore, we can use f (m,sp) to
denote the allocation rules for anonymous mechanisms, where m is the number of agents
who report si = 1. Since the posterior belief π(s, sp) is also symmetric in every private sig-
nal, we also write π(m,sp) as the posterior belief that a Bayesian agent will assign to the event
θ = 1 when observing a signal profile (s, sp) with ms = m. Lemma A1 then implies that an
anonymous mechanism is ex post incentive compatible if and only if ∀m ∈ I ≡ {1, ...,n} and
∀sp ∈ Sp, we have (i) f (m,sp) being non-decreasing in m, and (ii) f (m,sp) = f (m − 1, sp) if either
π(m − 1, sp) >maxi∈I qi or π(m,sp) <mini∈I qi . Hence, for every A-EPIC mechanism f , one can










ℓ′ , m > m
′ if ℓ > ℓ′, and
f (m,sp) = f (m
′, sp) if and only if ℓ = ℓ
′.
Now consider any optimal A-EPIC mechanism f . Let us construct two threshold values
m0 and m1 as follows: If π(n,0) < 1/2, let m0 = n + 1. Otherwise, we consider ℓ0, the smallest
ℓ ∈ Lf ≡ {1, ...,Lf } that satisfies E[θ = 1|ms ∈ I
f








, where ℓ1 is the smallest ℓ ∈ L
f that satisfies E[θ = 1|ms ∈ I
f
ℓ , sp = 1] ≥ 1/2, and .
By the optimality of f , we must have f (m,0) = 0 for all m < m0. Otherwise, we can further
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decrease f (m,0) for all m < m0, which strictly increases Pr(d = θ|sp = 0) without violating
any of the incentive compatibility constraints. This contradicts to that f being optimal. If
π(m0,1) > 1/2, we can use a similar argument to conclude that the optimality of f implies




= {m0}. But in this case, note that the optimality of f still implies that f (m,0) = 1
for all m > m0. Hence, increasing f (m0,0) to 1 will not violate any incentive compatibility
constraint and Pr(d = θ|ms = m0, sp = 0) will remain unchanged. Therefore, we can assume
without loss that in an optimal A-EPIC mechanism, f (m,0) = 1 if m ≥ m0. Similarly, we can
also conclude from the optimality of f that it is without loss to require f (m,1) = 0 for all
m <m1, and f (m,1) = 1 for all m ≥m1.
Finally, fix a preference profile q and consider any optimal A-EPIC mechanism f that is
characterized by the two threshold values m0 and m1. Consider the contingent k-voting rule
gk0,k1 with k0 = m0 and k1 = m1. It is straightforward to check that this g
k0,k1 implements in-
formative voting, since the corresponding direct mechanism f is ex post incentive compatible.
The fact that k0 = m0 and k1 = m1 makes sure that the informative voting equilibrium under
gk0,k1 will achieve the same Pr(d = θ|s, sp) for every (s, sp) ∈ S×Sp as the truth-telling equilibrium
under mechanism f . The construction of k0 and k1 also makes it clear that g
k0,k1 is responsive
if and only if f is responsive.
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove (i), fix a conflict-preserving sequence {qτ}τ∈N and pick any element q
τ from it. From
Proposition 5, we know that for the preference profile qτ , there exists a responsive contingent
k-voting rule that implements informative voting if and only if there exists a pair of integers
kτ0 , k
τ










































































































































































Let q0 ≡ q and suppose that there exists k0 ∈ {1, ...,n} ∩ K
0





















, we have k0+τ ∈ {1, ...,n+2τ}∩K
τ
0 . Similarly, if there exists k1 ∈ {1, ...,n}∩K
0
1 ,
then k1 + τ ∈ {1, ...,n+2τ} ∩K
τ

























































τ) are strictly less than one
if qτ < q̄τ . This implies that whenever qτ < q̄τ , both the intervals Kτ0 and K
τ
1 can contain at most
one integer. Hence, in this case the contingent k-voting rule that can be used to implement
informative voting is unique.20






























































































where [x]+ denotes the smallest integer that is larger or equal to x ∈ R. Since for the preference
profile q0 = q there exists a responsive contingent-k voting rule that implements informative
voting, from our analysis for (i) we can conclude that for every τ ∈ N and preference profile




1 implements informative voting. By Proposition 6, for an efficiency-
maximizing social planner who can observe all the n+2τ private signals and the public signal,



















signals equal to 1. Otherwise implementing d = 0 would be optimal.














































20The intervals Kτ0 and K
τ
1 will contain at least one integer (and at most two) if q̄
τ = q
τ
= q. In particular, Kτ0
will contain exactly two integers if and only if (π01)
−1
τ (q) is an integer. Similarly, there will be two integers in K
τ
1 if
and only if (π11)
−1
τ (q) is an integer.
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Both ∆0τ and ∆
1




τ = 0. This implies
that as τ increases and goes to ∞, the ex ante probability that the collective decision made in




1 coincides with the social planner’s choice is in-
creasing and converges to 1. Finally, for any preference profile qτ in the sequence, whenever a




1 with {kτ0 , k
τ
1 }∩{0,n+2τ+1} , ∅ is used all the pri-
vate information in the committee will be entirely disregarded for at least some realization of
the public signal. This implies that the efficiency of the informative voting equilibrium under
any non-responsive contingent k-voting rule would be strictly dominated by the social plan-
ner’s solution.21 Hence, for sufficiently large τ, it will also be dominated by the informative
voting equilibrium under the responsive contingent k-voting rule that we constructed above.
As a result, there must exist τ∗ ∈ N such that for all τ ≥ τ∗, there exists a responsive contingent
k-voting rule that is equivalent to an optimal A-EPIC mechanism.





























Hence, after adding sufficiently many members to the committee, the probability that the col-
lective decisions made in the informative voting equilibria under the corresponding responsive
contingent k-voting rules coincide with that in the informative voting equilibrium under the
simple majority rule becomes arbitrarily close to 1. Since the informative voting equilibrium
under the simple majority rule is asymptotically efficient if the agents’ private signals are in-
formative (α > 1/2), so are the informative voting equilibria under a responsive contingent
k-voting rules.
Proof of Proposition 5
We start from establishing a lemma that characterizes when informative voting can be imple-
mented by a given contingent k-voting rule with k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n}, which is in fact a counterpart
to Proposition 1.
21The assumption of the proposition implies that the public signal would not be so precise that it would be
optimal for the social planner to always follow the public signal. Otherwise, for the preference profile q there
cannot be a responsive contingent k-voting rule that implements informative voting.
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Lemma A2. A contingent k-voting rule with k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n} implements informative voting if and
only if














































Proof of Lemma A2. Suppose sp = 1. Given a responsive contingent k-voting rule g
k0,k1 , the
threshold value for choosing d = 1 is k1 ∈ {1, ...,n}. Assume all agents j , i are playing the
informative voting strategy. Conditional on being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent










































Now suppose sp = 0. Under the contingent k-voting rule g
k0,k1 , the threshold value for
choosing the decision d = 1 is k0 ∈ {1, ...,n}. Assume all agents j , i are playing the informative
voting strategy. Conditional on being pivotal, the posterior probability that agent i would


















Hence, the voting rule gk0,k1 implements informative voting if and only if ∀i ∈ I , qi ≥
max{π00,π
1





Lemma A2 implies that for the existence of a responsive contingent k-voting rule that im-
plements informative voting, it is necessary and sufficient that there exist k0, k1 ∈ {1, ...,n} sat-
isfying (A.8). To check whether such integers k0 and k1 exist, we first invert the functions π
0
0




1 of k1 that are defined in the above lemma. This is




−1 to q̄ and (π01)
−1 and (π11)
−1 to q. It is straightforward to check that if there









then k0 and k1 will also satisfy condition (A.8). .
Proof of Corollary 3
From Proposition 5, we know that for a given preference profile q, there exists a responsive
contingent k-voting rule gk0,k1 that implements informative voting if and only if there exist







−1(q̄) = 1. Thus, in this case both the intervals K0 and K1 will contain at least one
integer. It remains to show that for sufficiently large n, it is guaranteed that {1, ...,n} ∩K0 , ∅
and {1, ...,n} ∩K1 , ∅. This is not trivial because the intervals K0 and K1 actually also depend





































































































































We can now conclude that when agents’ preference are perfectly aligned, there exists a thresh-
old value n̄(q), such that for all n ≥ n̄(q), there exists a responsive contingent k-voting rule that
implements informative voting.
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Proof of Corollary 4
Plugging k0 = (n + 1)/2 + [(r − 1)/2]
+ in the formulas of π00 and π
0
1 that we obtained in Lemma











Similarly, with k1 = (n+1)/2− [(r − 1)/2]











The result of the corollary thus immediately follows Lemma A2.
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider a social planner who observes the whole profile of private signals s = (s1, ..., sn) and
the public signal sp. Suppose the public signal is r-times more informative than the private
signal, where r ≥ 0. Again we let ms =
∑n
i=1 si . To maximize the accuracy of his decision, the



















1 if ms − (n−ms) + r✶sp=1 − r✶sp=0 > 0,
{0,1} if ms − (n−ms) + r✶sp=1 − r✶sp=0 = 0,
0 if ms − (n−ms) + r✶sp=1 − r✶sp=0 < 0.















0. First, suppose that r > n. In this case, the public signal is so precise that the social planner
would find it optimal to always follow it and entirely ignore the private signals, i.e., d∗(s, sp) = sp
∀s ∈ S and sp ∈ Sp. Meanwhile, we have k(1) > n and k(0) < 1, which means that the agents’
votes would never count and the contingent majority rule simply replicates the outcome of the
obedient voting equilibrium. The statement of the proposition then immediately follows.















− 1 ≡ R1,
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There are four possible scenarios:
1. r is an even integer: R1 = r − 1 < r +1 = R0.
2. r is an odd integer: R1 = r − 2 < r = R0.
3. r is not an integer and [r]+ is even: R1 = [r]
+ − 1 < [r]+ +1 = R0.
4. r is not an integer and [r]+ is odd: R1 = [r]
+ − 2 < [r]+ = R0.
Since |ms − (n −ms)| is odd, the above four inequalities jointly show that the decision achieved
by the contingent majority rule always coincides with the planner’s choice.
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the following strategy profile of the agents in the two-stage voting game. In the first
stage, all agents vote for k0 if sp = 0, and they all vote for k1 if sp = 1. In the second stage, if
either sp = 0 and k
∗ = k0, or sp = 1 and k
∗ = k1, then all agents vote informatively. Since an
unilateral deviation from the above first-stage voting strategy will not change the threshold k∗
that will be selected to be used in the second stage, we need not specify the agents’ contingent
strategies for any other case.
We thus need only to check whether the agents indeed have the incentive to vote infor-
matively whenever (sp, k
∗) ∈ {(0, k0), (1, k1)}. This is the case because the informative voting
strategy profile actually constitutes an ex post Nash equilibrium under gk0,k1 , which implies
that no agent would have the incentive to unilaterally deviate from informative voting regard-
less of how she updates her beliefs after observing the first stage voting outcome. Hence, in
the two-stage voting game there must exist a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the
agents first vote to agree on choosing either k0 or k1 (depends on whether sp = 0 or sp = 1), and
then they all vote informatively in the second stage.
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Proof of Proposition 8
Since the signal sp is only observed to the controller and the vote takes place after the agents
receive the message from the controller, we have a dynamic game of incomplete information.
We look for sequential equilibria, which require the beliefs and the strategies of the players
to be sequentially rational and consistent (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Note that since the
biased of the controller is not (directly) payoff-relevant to the agents, we need to keep track of
agents’ beliefs about the state only.
First, consider the scenario where m = sp is sent. No agent would have the incentive to
deviate from obedient voting given all other agents are following the public signal revealed by
the controller. This is always the case regardless of the relative precision of the signals.22
Now consider the information set where m = ∅ is sent and the controller’s disclosure policy
is to withhold his information if and only if he observes sp = 1. Conditional all other agents are
voting informatively, voting informatively is optimal for agent i if and only if











2α(λ+ (1−λ)(1− β)) +
1
2(1−α)(λ+ (1−λ)β)
= Pr(θ = 0|si = 1,m = ∅)
and














= Pr(θ = 1|si = 0,m = ∅).
Since α,β ≥ 1/2 and λ > 0, the second inequality always holds. It can be also checked that the
first inequality holds if and only if (β−(1−α))λ ≥ β−α. Hence, whenever λ ≥ λ̂, the informative
voting strategy profile and the beliefs that are formed according to Bayes rule are sequentially
rational for the agents at the information set m = ∅. By the same token, if the controller only
reveals sp = 0 to the agents, no agent can profitably deviate from the proposed strategy profile
22In contrast, as implied by Corollary 1 informative voting does not constitute an equilibrium in these sub-
games whenever β > α.
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as long as λ ≥ λ̂ and beliefs are formed according to Bayes rule.
Given the strategies of the agents, suppose the controller observes sp = 1. By revealing
this information to the agents, his expected payoff is given by U rc (1) = −qc(1 − β). On the
other hand, withholding this information from the agents yields him an expected payoff of







is the probability that the committee reaches a wrong decision when all agents vote informa-
tively. Similarly, by revealing sp = 0 to the agents, the controller’s expected payoff is U
r
c (0) =
−(1 − qc)(1 − β), while concealing this information yields him an expected payoff of U
nr
c (0) =
−qcβP − (1− qc)(1− β)P. Hence, the controller would find it optimal to reveal sp = 1 and with-








c (0), which are equivalent to
qc ≤ q̂ =min
{
βP
(1− β)(1−P) + βP
,
(1− β)(1−P)
(1− β)(1−P) + βP
}
.
Similarly, revealing sp = 0 and withholding sp = 1 is optimal for the controller if
qc ≥ 1− q̂ =max
{
βP
(1− β)(1−P) + βP
,
(1− β)(1−P)
(1− β)(1−P) + βP
}
.
The threshold value q̂ achieves its supremum at P = 1 − β, which equals to 1/2. Also, since
α > 1/2, it is straightforward to check that P < 1/2 and, hence, q̂ ≥min{β,1− β} = 1− β.
In conclusion, if λ ≥ λ̂ and qc ≤ q̂ (or qc ≥ 1− q̂), the strategy profile stated in the proposition
together with the beliefs formed according to Bayes rule constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium. Since all information sets can be reached with positive probability, it is also a sequential
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 9
First, consider the scenario where m = sp is sent. By the same reasoning as in Corollary 4, no
agent would have the incentive to deviate from informative voting given all other agents are
voting informatively.
Next, consider the information set wherem = ∅ is sent and suppose the strategy of controller
is such that he never withholds information. In this case, the controller’s message is not infor-
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mative at all and given that the agents are unbiased and the voting threshold corresponds to
the simple majority rule, the informative voting strategy profile along with the beliefs formed
according to Bayes rule are clearly sequentially rational for the agents. Now suppose the con-
troller’s strategy is such that he will reveal his information to the agents if and only if sp = 1
(or sp = 0). By Proposition 8, we know that in this case no agent can profitably deviate from
informative voting provided that λ ≥ λ̂.
Given that the agents will always vote informatively, suppose that the controller observes
sp = 1. By withholding the signal, the controller obtains an expected payoff of U
nr
c (1) = −qc(1−
β)P − (1− qc)βP, while revealing yields U
r
c (1) = −qc(1− β)P


















Similarly, by concealing sp = 0 from the agents, the controller’s expected payoff is given by
Unrc (0) = −qcβP − (1 − qc)(1 − β)P, while revealing yields him an expected payoff of U
r
c (0) =
−qcβP̃ − (1 − qc)(1 − β)P
′. Hence, the controller would find it optimal to always share his in-
formation with the agents if U rc (1) ≥ U
nr
c (1) and U
r
c (0) ≥ U
nr
c (0). Note that these inequali-
ties trivially hold for all qc ∈ [0,1] if [(r − 1)/2]
+ = 0 or, equivalently, β ≤ α. Now suppose
[(r − 1)/2]+ ≥ 1. Then, it is straightforward to check that these two inequalities are satisfied if
and only if qc ∈ [q
∗,1− q∗], where
q∗ =
(1− β)(P ′ −P)
β(P − P̃) + (1− β)(P ′ −P)
≥ 0.
Since α ≥ 1/2 and Ckn = C
n−k






















and, hence, q∗ ≤ 1−β. Clearly, together with the beliefs formed according to Bayes rule, the pro-
posed strategies for the controller (always share his information) and the agents (always vote
informatively) constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It is also a sequential equilibrium
since all information set can be reached with positive probability in equilibrium. We thus have
proven the first part of the proposition. The proof of the second part of the proposition is
analogous, and we omit it here to avoid repetition.
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